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STATEMENT ON
THE PEACEKEEPER ICDM PROGRAM

BY

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8 DECEMBER 1982

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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7 DECEMBER 1982

MR. CHAIRMAN, AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS INDEED A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS OUR M-X PROGRAM, NOW CALLED PEACEKEEPER. BUT BEFORE DISCUSSING THE PEACEKEEPER DECISION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND REPORTED TO THE CONGRESS A BIT OVER TWO WEEKS AGO, I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISCUSS THE BROAD CONTEXT IN WHICH THAT DECISION WAS MADE.

THE GOAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN, AND REMAINS, PEACE. IN SEARCHING FOR PEACE, WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING TWO ROADS -- DETERRENCE AND ARMS REDUCTION. TOGETHER, THEY OFFER THE ONLY PROMISE OF AN ENDURING PEACE.

THE PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE, A POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, IS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR BY MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO MAKE THE COST TO ANY AGGRESSOR FOR STARTING A NUCLEAR WAR SO HIGH THAT IT WILL DETER THE AGGRESSOR FROM EVER STARTING SUCH A WAR. IF THE SOVIETS KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES OR HER ALLIES WOULD BRING SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE RETALIATION, THEY WOULD NEVER ATTACK. THEY WOULD BE DETERRED FROM EVER BEGINNING A NUCLEAR WAR.

THERE IS NOTHING NEW ABOUT OUR POLICY OF DETERRENCE. FOR ALMOST FOUR DECADES, EVERY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS APPROVED

IT AND HAS SEEN IT SUCCEED. DETERRENCE HAS KEPT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FROM WAR IN THE FACE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. HOWEVER, FOR DETERRENCE TO CONTINUE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE FUTURE, WE MUST TAKE STEPS NOW TO RESTORE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE THAT WAS LOST DUE TO THE RELENTLESS SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND OUR NEGLECT OF OUR DEFENSES DURING THE 1970s. IF WE DO NOT MODERNIZE OUR ARSENAL NOW, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN DOING FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, WE WILL ULTIMATELY LOSE THE CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY -- AND THEREFORE TO DETER.

• LET ME NOW COMMENT ON OUR SECOND ROAD TO PEACE - ARMS REDUCTION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO REACH A MEANINGFUL ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT PROVIDES FOR SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WE HAVE ALL BORNE WITNESS OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF REACHING SATISFACTORY AGREEMENTS.

TO ACHIEVE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS SEVERAL THINGS ARE NECESSARY; FIRST, BOTH SIDES MUST BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. BOTH SIDES MUST BE CONVINCED THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO ENTER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS NO TRIVIAL FEAT. WE SAW THIS EARLY IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WHEN SECRETARY VANCE WENT TO MOSCOW WITH A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIETS REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS IT BECAUSE THEY HAD NO INCENTIVE TO DO SO.

TODAY, THE SOVIETS ARE SITTING DOWN WITH US IN GENEVA AND DISCUSSING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MOST THREATENING AND

DESTABILIZING OF THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE -- THE LAND-BASED SS-20 MISSILE. ALSO THEY ARE MEETING WITH US IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

THIS CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY NOW HAVE INCENTIVES TO NEGOTIATE. NATO'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS OF PIRING II MISSILES AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE, MISSILE SYSTEMS WHICH THE SOVIETS CLEARLY FEAR, HAVE PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION WITH AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS. AND OUR PLANS FOR MODERNIZING OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WITH THE PEACEMAKER MISSILE, THE B-1 BOMBER, CRUISE MISSILES, AND THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE FORCES HAVE GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN OUR AND THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

BUT SITTING DOWN TO NEGOTIATE IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE SECOND STEP IS TO HAVE THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDE, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, WITH AGREEMENTS WHICH VASTLY REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES AND WHICH HAVE ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION -- THE ASSURANCE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE ABIDING BY THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

THESE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY WILL NOT YIELD THE RESULTS WE WANT UNLESS THE SOVIETS HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO REACH AGREEMENTS. THIS IS A MAJOR REASON WHY WE MUST CONTINUE WITH OUR

PROGRAM TO RESTORE OUR DEFENSES. IF WE WERE TO WALKER NOW, IF WE WERE TO DELAY OUR PEACEMAKER PROGRAM, WE WOULD BE SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL TO MOSCOW. WE WOULD BE TELLING THEM THAT THERE WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH US, TO REDUCE THEIR WEAPONS INVENTORY, SINCE WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN UP UNILATERALLY THE SYSTEM GIVING US THE GREATEST NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

TO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY, IF WE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZING OUR STRATEGIC FORCES, WE WILL RESTORE OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSEMENT THAT IS SO ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING THE PEACE. AND ONLY IF WE SHOW THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO RESTORING AND MAINTAINING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE WILL WE CONVINCE THEM TO REEVALUATE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS. THERE IS NO OTHER RATIONAL SOLUTION. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO GUARANTEE THE PEACE AND FREEDOM THAT ALL FREE MEN SEEK.

AS YOU WELL KNOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE RECENTLY MADE A VERY CRUCIAL DECISION ON A WEAPON SYSTEM THAT WE BELIEVE WILL MOVE US FORWARD ON THE TWO ROADS TO PEACE I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED -- DEFENSE AND ARMS REDUCTION. OF COURSE, I REFER TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S DECISION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1982 ON THE PEACEMAKER PROGRAM. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEND THE NEXT SEVERAL MINUTES EXPLAINING THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THIS DECISION, AND WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE THAT DECISION AND EXPLAIN HOW THE PEACEMAKER MISSILE SYSTEM CONTRIBUTES SO SIGNIFICANTLY TO DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL.

FOR OVER 20 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS RELIED ON A COMBINATION OF LAND-BASED MISSILES, SEA-BASED MISSILES, AND BOMBERS TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION. THIS STRATEGIC TRIAD, AS THE COMBINATION IS CALLED, IS SUFFICIENTLY DIVERSE TO ENSURE THAT U.S. FORCES WILL BE ABLE, UNDER ALL CONDITIONS, TO SURVIVE A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE AND TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs) OFFER A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD. THEY ARE ACCURATE AND RESPONSIVE, HAVE RELIABLE, REAL-TIME COMMUNICATIONS WITH COMMAND AUTHORITIES, POSSESS SHORT TIME-TO-TARGET CAPABILITY, AND OFFER ALERT RATES APPROACHING 100%. ICBMs ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO PLAN AND EXECUTE A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON ALL THREE TRIAD COMPONENTS. IN SHORT, LAND-BASED ICBMs ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE.

SINCE THE LATE 1960s, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENGAGED IN A MASSIVE AND DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC ARMS BUILD-UP THAT THREATENS THE SURVIVABILITY AND RETALIATORY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRIAD. SPECIFICALLY THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED NUMEROUS LARGE AND HIGHLY ACCURATE WEAPONS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING PART OF THE U.S. ICBM FORCE IN A FIRST STRIKE, WHILE EXPENDING A RELATIVELY SMALL PROPORTION OF THEIR ICBM FORCE IN THE PROCESS.

THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO TAKEN STEPS TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR RETALIATION. THEY HAVE HARDENED THEIR ICBM SILOS AND CRITICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES TO THE POINT THAT SURVIVING MINUTEMAN MISSILES HAVE ONLY LIMITED CAPABILITIES AGAINST THEM. THIS IMBALANCE IN SUCH A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC

CAPABILITY SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE STRENGTH OF OUR NUCLEAR
DEFENDENCE.

THE PEACEKEEPER MISSILE IS DESIGNED TO CORRECT THIS
IMBALANCE. UNLIKE THE MINUTEMAN, THE PEACEKEEPER HAS THE PROMPT,
HARD TARGET CAPABILITY NECESSARY TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST
THE MOST HIGHLY VALUED AND INCREASINGLY HARD SOVIET TARGETS. THE
PEACEKEEPER WILL ALSO DENY THE SOVIETS THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT A
CONFIDENT FIRST STRIKE. BUT LET ME FIRST DESCRIBE THE
PEACEKEEPER MISSILE.

PEACEKEEPER IS A FOUR-STAGE ICBM THAT CARRIES
10 INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE NUCLEAR REENTRY VEHICLES (RVs). IT
IS 71 FEET LONG, 92 INCHES IN DIAMETER, AND WEIGHS APPROXIMATELY
192,000 POUNDS. IT HAS MANY ADVANTAGES OVER MISSILE SYSTEMS
CURRENTLY IN THE U.S. INVENTORY. PEACEKEEPER WILL BE MORE
ACCURATE, CARRY MORE WARHEADS, AND HAVE GREATER OPERATIONAL
FLEXIBILITY THAN THE MINUTEMAN ICBMs. ITS GREATER ACCURACY,
WARHEAD YIELD, AND RESISTANCE TO IN-FLIGHT NUCLEAR EFFECTS
PROVIDE THE PEACEKEEPER WITH THE ESSENTIAL HARD-TARGET KILL
CAPABILITY WE NOW LACK. THE FIRST THREE STAGES OF THE
PEACEKEEPER USE SOLID PROPELLANT AND PROVIDE THE THRUST NEEDED TO
ACHIEVE INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE. THE FOURTH STAGE USES LIQUID
PROPELLANT TO CARRY OUT THE MANEUVERS THAT PROPERLY DEPLOY THE
RVs. ALONG WITH THE LIQUID PROPELLANT, THE FOURTH STAGE CARRIES
THE COMPUTERS AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT THAT GUIDE AND CONTROL THE
MISSILE FROM THE TIME OF LAUNCH THROUGH THE RELEASE OF ITS RVs.

THE PEACEKEEPER GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM USES AN ADVANCED INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEM (AIRS) THAT PROVIDES THE FLIGHT COMPUTER WITH INFORMATION ON MISSILE MOVEMENT DURING FLIGHT.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE THE BASING MODE. FOLLOWING ONE OF THE MOST INTENSE PERIODS OF EVALUATION IN RECENT MEMORY, WE HAVE SELECTED CLOSELY SPACED BASING AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT MODE FOR PEACEKEEPER. TRADITIONALLY, HARDNESS AND SPACING DECISIONS FOR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT NO MORE THAN ONE MISSILE COULD BE DESTROYED PER ATTACKING WARHEAD. THIS REMAINS TRUE TODAY. GREATER HARDNESS ALLOWS CLOSER SPACING BECAUSE IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO DESTROY HARDER TARGETS WITH ANY GIVEN WARHEAD.

TITAN AND MINUTEMAN LAUNCH FACILITIES WERE CONSERVATIVELY SPACED SEVERAL MILES APART BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY LOW HARDNESS LEVELS. AS MORE SOPHISTICATED HARDNESS MEASUREMENTS AND TESTING TECHNIQUES WERE DEVELOPED, THEY WERE APPLIED IN THE UPGRADE PROGRAM THAT HARDENED MINUTEMAN SILOS. THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY (DNA) REPORTED LAST YEAR ON A SERIES OF TESTS AND ANALYSES TO VALIDATE SILO HARDNESS LEVELS. THE CONCLUSION OF THE WORK WAS THAT SILO DESIGNS OF MUCH GREATER HARDNESS ARE FEASIBLE. THIS CONCLUSION HAS BEEN FURTHER VALIDATED BY THE DEMONSTRATION OF EVEN GREATER HARDNESS THROUGH FURTHER TESTING IN RECENT MONTHS. THIS BREAKTHROUGH PERMITTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLOSELY SPACED BASING CONCEPT. AIR FORCE STUDIES, UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME, INDICATED THAT SEVERE FRATRICIDE

EFFECTS WOULD OCCUR TO ATTACKING WEAPONS AS A RESULT OF CLOSE SILO SPACING AND THIS WOULD BE A GREATER PROBLEM AS SPACING BECAME SMALLER AND SMALLER. THE TOWNES PANEL, STUDYING PEACEKEEPER BASING ALTERNATIVES DURING 1981, RECOGNIZED THIS FACT AND RECOMMENDED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF WAYS TO EXPLOIT FRATRICIDE EFFECTS TO ADVANTAGE IN PEACEKEEPER BASING. THIS WAS DONE AS PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. WITH THE NEW EVIDENCE IN SUPERHARD SILO DESIGN TECHNOLOGY, AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF FRATRICIDE EFFECTS, AND THE IMPETUS PROVIDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THE CSB CONCEPT WAS DEFINED, ANALYZED AND IS NOW THE PERMANENT BASING SYSTEM FOR PEACEKEEPER.

CSB INVOLVES DEPLOYING 100 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES IN SUPERHARD SILOS AT CLOSE DISTANCES THAT MAXIMIZE THE PHENOMENON OF FRATRICIDE WHILE STILL FAR ENOUGH APART TO PREVENT ONE WEAPON FROM DESTROYING MORE THAN ONE SILO. THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE CSB CONCEPT ARE THE SUPERHARDENED SILO, CLOSE SPACING AND THE STATE OF THE ARMY.

THE SUPERHARDENED SILOS, WHICH PERMIT CLOSE SPACING, ALSO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM USING HIGHLY FRACTIONATED MISSILES TO ATTACK PEACEKEEPER. FRACTIONATION REFERS TO THE PRACTICE OF PUTTING MANY, RELATIVELY LOW YIELD, WARHEADS ON A SINGLE MISSILE. BECAUSE THE SOVIETS MUST USE VERY LARGE WARHEADS TO ATTACK SUPERHARDENED SILOS, THEY CANNOT COUNTER CSB SIMPLY BY DEPLOYING MORE WARHEADS ON EXISTING MISSILES. THUS, THE SOVIETS MUST

CHANGE THEIR ARSENAL IN RESPONSE TO CSB; THEY CANNOT RELY ON THE MOMENTUM OF FAST DEVELOPMENTS.

THE DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS MUST BE SMALL ENOUGH TO ASSURE FRATRICIDE ON INCOMING WARHEADS BUT GREAT ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM SUCCESSFULLY TARGETING MULTIPLE SILOS WITH ONE WARHEAD. A SPACE OF 1,600 FEET BETWEEN THE SILOS APPEARS NOW TO BE THE OPTIMUM DISTANCE TO ASSURE THESE OBJECTIVES.

AN ARRAY IS THE TERM GIVEN TO THE CSB DEPLOYMENT FIELD. DIFFERENT ARRAY SHAPES WILL CREATE DIFFERENT FRATRICIDE PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS. THE MOST PROMISING SHAPE, AND THE ONE NOW CONSIDERED FOR CSB, IS A LONG, THIN COLUMN WITH A NORTH-SOUTH ORIENTATION. IT IS ABOUT ONE MILE WIDE AND 14 MILES LONG.

IN SUMMARY, THE BASELINE CSB CONCEPT CONSISTS OF AN ARRAY OF 100 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES IN 100 SILOS HARDENED TO VERY HIGH LEVELS FOR GROUND BURSTS AND PROVIDING EVEN GREATER PROTECTION FROM AIRBURSTS, AND SPACED AT 1600 FEET. THIS RESULTS IN A SYSTEM DEPLOYABLE ON ONLY ABOUT 20 SQUARE MILES OF LAND. WE WILL ACHIEVE IOC IN LATE 1966. THE PROGRAM COST IS \$26.4 BILLION IN FY 62 DOLLARS, AND IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AUTHORIZED FY 1963 FUNDS BE APPROPRIATED IN ORDER TO MEET THAT IOC.

CSB IS EFFECTIVE BECAUSE THE CLOSE SPACING OF THE PEACEKEEPER SILOS FORCES ATTACKING WEAPONS TO BE CLOSELY SPACED. WHEN EARLY-ARRIVING WARHEADS DETONATE, THE NUCLEAR EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE DETONATION DESTROY OR DEFLECT OFF-COURSE THOSE WEAPONS

THEY FOLLOW. HOWEVER, THE SILENCE WOULD SURVIVE THESE EFFECTS BECAUSE THEY ARE MUCH HARDER THAN THE SOVIET WARHEADS. THE SOVIETS DO NOT NOW HAVE, NOR ARE THEY PROJECTED TO HAVE IN THE NEAR-FUTURE, THE CAPABILITY TO AVOID THESE FRATRICIDE EFFECTS WITH ANY CONFIDENCE.

THE MAJOR NUCLEAR EFFECTS THAT COMBINE TO MAKE AN ATTACK ON CSB INEFFECTIVE ARE BOTH PROMPT AND LONG TERM. THE PROMPT NUCLEAR EFFECTS INCLUDE PENETRATION, AIRBLAST AND THE FIREBALL. THESE EFFECTS DESTROY OR DEGRADE THE PERFORMANCE OF INCOMING WEAPONS AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ABILITY TO DETONATE THEIR WARHEADS AT PRECISELY THE RIGHT TIME AND WITH ALL OF THEM AT THE RIGHT POSITION, PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM EXECUTING A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON ALL CSB SILOS OR A FAST-PACED ATTACK. WHILE THE SOVIETS MIGHT CONSIDER A SLOW-PACED ATTACK TO AVOID THESE PROMPT EFFECTS, THEY WILL FIND THAT THE LONG TERM EFFECTS, SUCH AS DUST AND DEBRIS, FORECLOSE THEIR ABILITY TO REATTACK FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME AFTER AN INITIAL WAVE. DURING THAT TIME, SURVIVING MISSILES COULD BE LAUNCHED IN RETALIATION.

THE SOVIETS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO PREVENT LAUNCH. THIS 'PINDOWN' STRATEGY, WHILE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED CONTINUOUSLY AND FLAWLESSLY DURING HIGHLY STRESSFUL WARTIME CONDITIONS. THUS, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT OF PREVENTING LAUNCH OF SURVIVING PEACEKEEPER MISSILES. ALSO, PINDOWN ATTACKS WOULD CONSUME SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES WITHOUT DESTROYING A SINGLE MISSILE.

FRATRICIDE, THAT, WHEN COMBINED WITH SUPERHEATED SILOS, PUTS A LIMIT ON THE SIZE AND PLACE OF AN EFFECTIVE ATTACK ON THE SILO ARMY AND REDUCES THE USEFULNESS OF THE LARGE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS THE SOVIETS POSSESS. SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE UNABLE TO GENERATE A HIGH CONFIDENCE ATTACK ON PEACEKEEPER IN CSB, THEY WILL SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN INITIATING A CONFLICT, AND THUS, DETERRENCE WILL BE ENHANCED. ✓

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THE SOVIETS MAY CHOOSE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS TO THEIR ICBM FORCES IN ORDER TO THREATEN PEACEKEEPER IN CSB. IN THE NEAR-TERM THROUGH THE EARLY 1990's, THEY COULD INCREASE THE YIELD OF THEIR REENTRY VEHICLES IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE HARDNESS LEVEL OF CSB SILOS, BUT THE LARGER YIELD WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE FRATRICIDE EFFECTS. THEREFORE THE CSB DEPLOYMENT OF 100 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES IN 100 CAPSULES WILL REMAIN A STRONG AND VIABLE DETERRENT AGAINST THE NEAR-TERM THREAT.

FOR THE LONGER TERM, MID TO LATE-1990's, THE SOVIETS COULD DEPLOY LOW YIELD, HIGHLY ACCURATE, EARTH-PENETRATING WEAPONS THAT COULD THREATEN THE HARD CSB SILOS AND MINIMIZE OR AVOID FRATRICIDE. EVEN IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL IN DOING SO, WE WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS TO ENHANCE CSB AND MAINTAIN ITS VIABILITY. OUR OPTIONS INCLUDE STRAIGHTFORWARD, RELATIVELY INEXPENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES, CONCEALMENT IN ADDITIONAL SILOS, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, OR DEEP BASING. IN ALL CASES, SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS CAN BE COUNTERED EFFECTIVELY BY U.S. RESPONSES. A CRUCIAL POINT IS THAT THESE RESPONSES WILL ALSO BE

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QUICKLY DEPLOYABLE BECAUSE OF OUR READINESS THAT WILL RESULT FROM OUR R&D PROGRAM. THIS FEATURE WILL ALLOW US TO BE SEVERAL YEARS AHEAD OF POTENTIAL SOVIET RESPONSES -- A FACTOR THAT SHOULD DISCOURAGE ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT CSB THROUGH EXPENSIVE AND RISKY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND, INSTEAD, GIVE THE SOVIETS STRONG REASON TO NEGOTIATE.

I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED HOW PEACEKEEPER IN CSB WILL ENHANCE DETERRENCE. THAT OUTCOME, BY ITSELF, IS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY OUR DECISION. HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL ANOTHER VERY SIGNIFICANT OUTCOME OF THIS DECISION - IT ALSO ENHANCES PROSPECTS FOR SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS. IT DOES THIS BY PROVIDING THE ESSENTIAL INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A WORKABLE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. BASED BOTH ON YEARS OF OBSERVATION OF PAST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND ON COMMON SENSE, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH OR THE SOVIETS WILL DICTATE RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE. I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THIS PEACEKEEPER MISSILE SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS THAT WILL PROVIDE GREATER STABILITY AND PROMISES OF PEACE FOR US ALL.

I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME.

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